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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-2(a). 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has authority to review the Workforce Appeals Board 
decision pursuant to Utah Ann § 78-2(a)-2(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Did Fresenius Medical Care present competent evidence that they had just 
cause for discharging the claimant. This issue was preserved for review in the 
proceedings below at R. 50. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2)(a), which 
provides: 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for the purpose of establishing a waiting 
period: 
(2) (a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause... 
1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the issue of whether Mr. Golchin was terminated by 
Fresenius Health Care for just cause. The Department of Workforce Services 
Determined that he was and denied him unemployment benefits. The Workforce 
Services Appeals Board upheld this decision. Mr. Golchin contends that Fresenius 
presented no competent evidence to support the conclusion that he was terminated for 
just cause. The relevant facts are as follows: 
FACTS 
1. Mr. Golchin was an employee of Fresenius Health Medical Care beginning 
on September 23, 2002. (R 73) 
2. He suffered a work related injury to his back on December 25, 2002. ( R 
46) 
3. His doctor restricted him to light duty work as of December 31, 2002. (R 
47) 
4. His employer found out about his light duty work restriction on March 25, 
2003. (76) . 
5. His regular rate of pay was $9.68 per hour. ( 73). 
6. Occasionally, Mr. Golchin was authorized by his supervisor to clock in as 
an alternate at a rate of pay of $12.20 per hour. ( 74) 
7. On March 25, the same day Fresenius found out that the appellant had been 
released to light duty, they also claimed they had discovered that Mr. Golchin had 
clocked in as an alternate without authorization on January 2, 2003; January 12, 2003; 
January 13, 2003; February 24, 2003; February 25, 2003; March 3, 2003; March 4, 
2003; March 5, 2003; March 7, 2003; March 9, 2003; March 20, 2003 and March 21, 
2003; ( 74, 75, 76, 87 and 88.) 
8. They had never reviewed his time cards previously. (91). 
9. They only reviewed the appellant's time cards. ( 90). 
10. The respondents keep no written records of when the supervisor authorized 
a person to clock in as an alternate. (81). 
11. John Summers was Mr. Golchin's supervisor. ( 85 and 86). 
12. Summers can't remember which days he gave Mr. Golchin permission to 
clock in as an alternate. (86). 
13. Summers claims he could only recall for certain that he did not authorize 
Mr. Golchin to clock in as an alternate on March 20 and March 21, 2003. ( 87 and 88). 
14. However, Summers did not Work on March 20 and 21, 2003. (® 119). 
15. The supervisor on those days was Vince Gonzales. (120). 
16. Mr. Golchin testified that he was authorized to clock in as an alternate on 
those days. (109). 
3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Golchin was terminated for clocking in as an alternate when he was not 
authorized to do so. However, Fresenius presented no competent evidence that Mr. 
Golchin was not authorized to clock in as and alternate. The circumstances show that 
clocking in as an alternate without authorization was just a pretext for firing him 
because he had suffered a work related injury. 
ARGUMENT 
In order to deny unemployment benefits, the employer must show that it had 
just cause for discharging the employee. U.C.A.§ 35A-4-40592)(a). In this case, the 
employer claims that the Appellant was terminated for clocking in as an alternate 
without authorization. However, the employer could produce no credible evidence 
that the Appellant ever clocked in as an alternate without authorization from his 
supervisor. 
Fresenius kept no records of the days an employee was authorized to clock in 
as an alternate. Thus they have no specific documentation by which they can go back 
and determine whether, on a particular day, the Petitioner was authorized to clock in 
as an alternate. The Petitioner's supervisor, John Summers, testified that he gave the 
Petitioner permission to clock in as an alternate at different times, but cannot 
remember the dates. The only dates he claims he recalls for certain that he did not 
4. 
give the Petitioner permission to clock in as an alternate were March 20th and 21st. 
Thus, the testimony comes down to two days that Fresenius claims the Petitioner was 
not authorized to clock in as an alternate. However, Summers testified that he did not 
work those two days. The supervisor on those days was Vince Gonzales. However, 
Mr Gonzales was not called to testify. Hence the only person who testified with 
personal knowledge regarding whether he had permission was the Petitioner himself. 
He testified that he was authorized to clock in as an alternate. 
Interestingly, the issue of whether Mr. Golchin had clocked in properly never 
arose until his supervisors at Fresenius found out that he suffered a work related injury 
and had been placed on light duty. At that time, they initiated an extensive review of 
his time records. They had never reviewed his time records before. Furthermore, they 
did not review anyone else's time records either. This appears to have been the only 
systematic review of an employee's time records that Fresenius had ever undertaken 
up to that time. Hence, it appears to have been conducted as a pretext to terminate Mr. 
Golchin because of his work related injury. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue in this case is whether the petitioner had permission to clock in as 
alternate on those days when he did so. The Scott Summer's, Mr. Golchin's 
supervisor, testified that he could not recall any days except March 20 and 21st. 
5. 
However, he also testified that he did not work those day and so would not have any 
personal knowledge of whether the Mr. Golchin had permission to clock in as an 
alternate or not. The reason Fresenius gives for firing Mr. Golchin appears to have 
been a pretext to disguise the fact that they were really firing him because of his work 
related injury. Because of this, Fresenius did not have just cause to fire Mr. Golchin 
and therefore, he is entitled to keep his unemployment benefits. 
DATED this I day of June, 2004 
6. 
ADDENDUM 
104 UTAH WORKFORCE SERVICES CODE 574 
An individual in training with the approval of the 
on is not ineligible to receive benefits by reason of 
l i a b i l i t y for work, failure to search for work, re-
of suitable work, failure to apply for or to accept 
>le work, or not having been unemployed for a 
ig period of one week with respect to any week the 
dual is in the approved training. For purposes of 
Subsection (2Xa), the division shall approve any 
atory apprenticeship-related training. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chap-
o otherwise eligible individual shall be denied ben-
br any week: 
(i) because the individual is in training approved 
nder Section 236(aXD of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 
LS.C. 2296(a); 
(ii) for leaving work to enter training described in 
ubsection (2XbXi) if the work left is not suitable 
mployment; or 
(iii) because of the application to any such week in 
aining of provisions in this law or any applicable 
deral unemployment compensation law relating to 
l i a b i l i t y for work, active search for work, or re-
isal to accept work. 
For purposes of this Subsection (2), "suitable em-
e n f means work of a substantially equal or higher 
evel than the individual's past adversely affected 
yment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act of 
and wages for tha t work at not less than 80% of the 
foal's average weekly wage as determined for the 
ses of the Trade Act of 1974. 
department may, by rule, waive or alter either or 
3 requirements of Subsections (lXa) and (b) as to 
j attached to regular jobs and as to other types of 
tuations with respect to which it finds that compli-
the requirements would be oppressive, or would be 
it with the purposes of this chapter as long as the 
t conflict with Subsection 35A-4-40K1). 1999 
• Eligibil ity for benefits after rece iv ing work-
ers' compensat ion or occupational d isease 
compensat ion. 
rithstanding any requirements involving base peri-
r benefit compensational factors provided for under 
»r a person who has had a continuous period of 
• injury for which he was compensated under the 
mpensation or the occupational disease laws of this 
ider federal law shall, if he is otherwise eligible, 
be entitled to receive the unemployment compen-
ifits he would have been entitled to receive under 
I regulations based on his potential eligibility at the 
last employment. 
fit r ights shall not be preserved under this section 
individual: 
iles a claim for benefits with respect to a week no 
lan 90 days after the end of the continuous period 
jess or injury; and 
Jes the claim with respect to a week within the 
ith period immediately following the commence-
f such period of sickness or injury. 1996 
Inel igibi l i ty for benefits. 
idual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of 
* a waiting period: 
i) For the week in which the claimant left work 
untarily without good cause, if so found by the 
ision, and for each week thereafter until the claim-
t has performed services in bona fide, covered 
ployment and earned wages for those services 
ial to at least six times the claimant's weekly 
lefit amount. 
(b) A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for 
benefits if the claimant leaves work under circum-
stances of such a nature that it would be contrary to 
equity and good conscience to impose a disqualifica-
tion. 
(c) Using available information from employers 
and the claimant, the division shall consider for the 
purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the 
claimant's actions, and the extent to which the ac-
tions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to 
the labor market in reaching a determination of 
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to 
equity and good conscience. 
(d) Notwithstanding any other subsection of this 
section, a claimant who has left work voluntarily to 
accompany, follow, or join the claimant's spouse to or 
in a new locality does so without good cause for 
purposes of Subsection (1). 
(2) (a) For the week in which the claimant was dis-
charged for jus t cause or for an act or omission in 
connection with employment, not constituting a 
crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and 
adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found 
by the division, and thereafter until the claimant has 
earned an amount equal to a t least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide cov-
ered employment. 
(b) For the week in which he was discharged for 
dishonesty constituting a crime or any felony or class 
A misdemeanor in connection with his work as shown 
by the facts, together with his admission, or as shown 
by his conviction of tha t crime in a court of competent 
jurisdiction and for the 51 next following weeks. 
Wage credits shall be deleted from the claimant's base 
period, and are not available for this or any subse-
quent claim for benefits. 
(3) (a) I f the division finds tha t the claimant has failed 
without good cause to properly apply for available 
suitable work, to accept a referral to suitable work 
offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable 
work offered by an employer or the employment 
office. The ineligibility continues until the claimant 
has performed services in bona fide covered employ-
ment and earned wages for the services in an amount 
equal to a t least six times the claimant's weekly 
benefit amount. 
(b) (i) A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for 
benefits for failure to apply, accept referral, or 
accept available suitable work under circum-
stances of such a nature t h a t it would be contrary 
to equity and good conscience to impose a dis-
qualification. 
(ii) The division shall consider t h e purposes of 
this chapter, the reasonableness of the claimant's 
actions, and the extent to which the actions 
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the 
labor market in reaching a determination of 
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary 
to equity and good conscience. 
(c) In determining whether or not work is suitable 
for an individual, the division shall consider the: 
(i) degree of risk involved to his health, safety! 
and morals; 
(ii) individual's physical fitness and prior 
training; 
(iii) individual's prior earnings and experi-
ence; 
(iv) individual's length of unemployment; 
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